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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Reynolds appeals from the district court's order denying 
suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedinss 
The Presentence Report ("PSI"), sets forth the events leading to Reynolds' 
conviction as follows: 
According to the appended Boise Police Department report, 
on March 3rd, 2007, at approximately 1600 hours, Officer Stiles 
responded to the SIDS death of a two-year-old infant at 6501 
Poplar in Boise, Idaho. Upon his arrival, Officer Stiles could smell 
the odor of growing marijuana coming from an upstairs bedroom, 
which was later identified as Michael Reynolds' room. When 
Officer Stiles asked him about the contents of his room, Mr. 
Reynolds told him that he had been smoking marijuana inside the 
room earlier in the day, and indicated that he would have to 
produce a search warrant in order to enter his room. A search 
warrant was later obtained, and during it's [sic] execution, Officer 
Stiles found 15 live growing marijuana plants in Mr. Reynolds' 
bedroom, along with fertilizer, growing lights, water and an 
instructional book about the growing of marijuana. Also found in 
Mr. Reynolds' room were 11 individually packaged plastic bags of 
marijuana, consistent with the sales of marijuana, and numerous 
marijuana smoking pipes. The contents of the plastic bags was 
[sic] later NIK tested and were found to be presumptive positive for 
marijuana. 
(PSI, p.2.) 
Reynolds was charged with one felony count of manufacturing a controlled 
substance (marijuana) and one misdemeanor count of possession of drug 
paraphernalia. (R., pp.20-21.) Reynolds filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
seized from his bedroom, claiming he was one of three renters living in the 
residence, and even though he allegedly advised officers of that fact, the search 
warrant failed to provide particularity because it described the house as a single 
family residence, and failed to divulge his bedroom was one of three separate 
rental units which shared common areas. (R., pp.31-45.) After the state filed an 
objection and responsive memorandum (R., pp.48-57), Reynolds filed an 
addendum to his motion to suppress: an affidavit by Reynolds' landlord stating 
she owned the residence and rented it out as three separate units (one in the 
basement, two on the main level), and each bedroom had its own lock and key. 
(R., pp.60-63.) 
A hearing on Reynolds' suppression motion was held, in which Detective 
Stiles and Reynolds each testified. Detective Stiles explained that when he 
arrived at the Poplar residence, there was no indication from anything inside or 
outside of the house that indicated that it was a boarding house, although he 
realized there were several people living in the house. (Supp. Tr., p.16, Ls.8-17; 
p.20, L.22 - p.21, L.9; p.25, Ls.6-13; p.28, Ls.6-10; p.47, L.21 - p.48, L.1; p.49, 
Ls.2-4, 17-19.) Detective Stiles also explained that the two main floor bedrooms 
were locked by their door knob locks. (Supp. Tr., p.14, Ls.5-20; p.28, L.22 - p.29, 
L.4.) Reynolds testified that he had a rental agreement to rent his bedroom, the 
other main floor bedroom was rented to another man, and the basement was 
rented to a couple -- all sharing the common areas. (Supp. Tr., p.53, L.21 - p.55, 
L.15.) After the hearing, the district court issued memorandum decision denying 
Reynolds' motion to suppress. (R., pp.67-75.) 
On October 11, 2007, Reynolds entered a conditional guilty plea to both 
manufacturing a controlled substance (marijuana) and possession of drug 
paraphernalia, reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his 
suppression motion. (R., pp.77-78, 84-85.) Reynolds was sentenced on the 
manufacturing a controlled substance charge to a unified five-year term with two 
and one-half years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (R., 
pp.86-89.) After the retained jurisdiction period, Reynolds' sentence was 
suspended and he was granted probation. (R., pp.95-100.) Reynolds filed a 
timely notice of appeal from the district court's denial of his suppression motion. 
(R., pp.102-104.) 
ISSUE 
Reynolds states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Reynolds' motion to 
suppress because the warrant lacked particularity regarding the 
search of Mr. Reynolds' apartment? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court properly deny Reynolds' motion to suppress since the 
search warrant described with sufficient particularity the place to be searched 
and was not overbroad? 

B. Standard Of Review 
A defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained through a search 
warrant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, any 
claimed constitutional infirmity in the search. State v. Carlson, 134 ldaho 471, 
475, 4 P.3d 1122, I126 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Wilson, 130 ldaho 213, 215, 
938 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Kelly, 106 ldaho 268, 275, 678 
P.2d 60, 67 (Ct. App. 1984); see also State v. Lane, 56 Wash. App. 286, 293, 
786 P.2d 277, 281 (1989). The appellate court exercises free review over 
challenges to the sufficiency of a search warrant. State v. Schanefelt, 115 ldaho 
129,765 P.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1988). 
C. The Search Warrant Met The Particularity Requirement For A Search 
Warrant, It Was Not Overbroad, And Even If There Was A Defect In The 
Search Warrant's Description Of The Place To Be Searched, The Search 
Of Reynolds' Bedroom Was Still Reasonable 
Reynolds asserts that the description of the place to be searched is 
inadequate because it did not disclose that the residence was a multi-family or 
multi-unit residence.' (Appellants' brief, p.1 I .) This argument fails for three 
' The district court held, or impliedly held, that (1) the search warrant met the 
particularity requirement, especially under State v. Younq, 136 ldaho 711, 39 
P.3d 651 (Ct. App. 2002), by at least including the correct street address, (2) a 
search warrant was unnecessary to search Reynolds' bedroom for marijuana 
under the "plain smell" doctrine, and (3) because Detective Stiles did not know, 
and should not have reasonably known, about the multi-unit character of the 
Poplar residence, the search warrant was not invalid. (See R., pp.67-75.) 
On appeal, the state presents two of the district court's bases for denying 
Reynolds' suppression motion, and adds another ground for upholding the district 
court's ruling. The district court's ultimate decision will be upheld on an 
alternative basis if the law supports it. McKinnev v. State, 133 ldaho 695, 700, 
reasons. First, the entire house -- of which Reynolds' bedroom was a part -- was 
sufficiently described in the search warrant. Second, regardless of how the 
affidavit for search warrant described Reynolds' bedroom, the affidavit provided 
probable cause to search his bedroom for marijuana because Detective Stiles 
could smell the odor of growing marijuana emanating from it. Finally, even 
assuming for the sake of argument that the search warrant lacked an adequate 
description of the place to be searched, the search of Reynolds' bedroom was 
still reasonable under Marvland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987), because 
Detective Stiles did not know, nor should he reasonably have known, of the multi- 
unit nature of the residence. 
1. The Search Warrant Satisfied The Particularitv Requirement 
"Both the federal constitution and the constitution of ldaho mandate 
particularity in the description of the place to be searched." State v. Schanefelt, 
115 ldaho 129, 130, 765 P.2d 154, 155 (Ct. App. 1988). The purpose of the 
particularity requirement is to minimize the risk that officers will search in a place 
other than that intended by the judge who issued the warrant. Schanefelt, 115 
ldaho at 130. 765 P.2d at 155. 
The applicable test for determining the sufficient degree of 
particularity is whether "the officer with a search warrant can with 
reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended." This 
992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999) ("If a district court reaches the correct result by an 
erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the order upon the correct theory."); State 
v. Avelar, 129 ldaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997); see I.R.C.P. 61 
("The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in 
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties"). 
Court has expanded on this test: "The description must be 
sufficiently clear so that the property to be searched is recognizable 
from other neighboring properties." 
State v. Carlson, 101 ldaho 598, 599, 618 P.2d 776, 777 (1980) (citations 
omitted). The warrant is to be interpreted in a "commonsense and realistic 
fashion." State v. Sapp, 11 0 ldaho 153, 155, 71 5 P.2d 366, 369 (Ct. App. 1986). 
"The fact that the officers who applied for the warrant are the same officers who 
execute it is a factor to be taken into consideration when evaluating the 
description." ; United States v. Turner, 770 F.2d 1508 (9Ih Cir. 1985); State v. 
Hart, 100 ldaho 137, 594 P.2d 647 (1979); see also United States v. Occhipinti, 
-
998 F.2d 791, 799 (loth Cir. 1993) ("knowledge of the executing officer can be 
considered in determining the sufficiency of the description"); United States v. 
Clement, 747 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1984) (knowledge of executing officer relevant in 
determining whether wrong apartment number should invalidate warrant). When 
the same officers are involved in obtaining and executing the warrant, the 
objectives of ascertaining and identifying the property to be searched from other 
properties, is more likely to be met. Sapp, 170 ldaho at 155, 715 P.2d at 368. 
In Reynolds' case, the search warrant identified the residence to be 
searched as follows: 
6501 W Poplar Street, Boise, Ada County, Idaho, being a single 
family, single story, with basement residence. The residence faces 
North, is blue in color with the numbers 6501 near the front door. 
The residence is between Liberty and Raymond streets on Poplar. 
There are two vehicles in the driveway, one is a white Ford and the 
other is a blue Ford. 
(R., pp.40-41.) 
The description of the residence to be searched was more than adequate. 
As explained by the ldaho Court of Appeals in State v. Young, 136 ldaho 711, 
715,39 P.3d 651,655 (Ct. App. 2002): 
Where one part of the description of the premises to be 
searched is inaccurate, but the description has other parts which 
identify the place to be searched with particularity, searches 
pursuant to such warrants have been routinely upheld. United 
States v. Turner, 770 F.2d 1508, 151 1 (gth Cir.1985); [United States 
v.] Gitcho, 601 F.2d [369] at 371 [8" Cir. 19791. A correct street 
address, even when no other description is given, is sufficiently 
particular to withstand constitutional scrutiny because it meets both 
prongs of the particularity test. United States v. Dancy, 947 F.2d 
1232, 1234 (5th Cir. 1991). Extraneous information, such as a legal 
or detailed physical description of the premises to be searched, is 
not required. State v. Holman, 109 ldaho 382, 388, 707 P.2d 493, 
499 (Ct. App.1985). Because search warrants are not deeds or tax 
notices, they are not subject to technical drafting requirements and 
should be interpreted in a commonsense and realistic fashion. Id. 
Even though, in hindsight, Detective Stiles' affidavit for a search warrant did not 
accurately describe the legal (i.e., rental) arrangement pertaining to Reynolds' 
bedroom, the search warrant nonetheless particularly described the physical 
residence to be searched by providing the correct street address, which included 
Reynolds' bedroom. 
In addition, Detective Stiles, who obtained the search warrant, had 
personal knowledge of the residence, having been dispatched there the same 
day to investigate the death of a baby. (R., pp.40-45; Supp. Tr., p.12, Ls.6-15.) 
Detective Stiles was one of the officers that executed the search warrant. (Supp. 
Tr., p.22, 1.2 - p.24, 1.7.) The chance that Detective Stiles could have driven to 
some other home nearby and executed or attempted to execute the warrant was 
remote at best. See United States v. Durk, 149 F.3d 464 (6'h Cir. 1998). Indeed, 
there is nothing in the record to suggest Detective Stiles had any problem at all 
finding the residence and executing the search warrant there. See United States 
v. Gahaqan, 865 F.2d 1490, 1499 (6" Cir. 1989); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 
219 Va. 520, 248 S.E.2d 786 (1978). A review of the record establishes that the 
premises was described with such particularity that it could be distinguished from 
other properties. Reynolds has failed to establish that the description of the 
premises to be searched was so defective rending the search warrant invalid. 
2. The Search Warrant Was Not Overbroad 
Moreover, because the search warrant affidavit provided probable cause 
to search Reynolds' bedroom, the warrant was not overbroad as to that 
bedroom2 As explained by the Ninth Circuit in its recent decision in U.S. v. 
m, 2009 WL 579585, 7 (9th Cir. 2009): 
The Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant describe with 
particularity the "things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
Although Reynolds' appellate brief does not contain the word "overbroad," such 
an argument was presented to the district court in Reynolds' memorandum in 
support of his suppression motion (R., pp.33-34), and referenced in the district 
court's memorandum decision (R., p.67). Even if the search of the other first 
floor renter's bedroom were deemed "overbroad," the search of Reynolds' 
bedroom would not be invalidated. As explained in State v. Bulain, 120 ldaho 
878,881,820 P.2d 1235,1238 (Ct. App. 1991): 
Bulgin also argues that the warrant is defectively overbroad 
because it includes the authorization to search for items other than 
methamphetamine, and that as to those items there was no 
probable cause to search. Even assuming without deciding that the 
warrant was partially overbroad, this does not render the search 
and seizure of the methamphetamine invalid. When a warrant is 
partially overbroad, only the property unlawfully seized is subject to 
suppression. State v. Bussard, 114 ldaho 781, 787, 760 P.2d 
11 97, 1202 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Search warrants must be specific in both particularity and breadth. 
See United Sfafes v. Towne, 997 F.2d 537, 544 (9' Cir. 1993). 
"Particularity is the requirement that the warrant must clearly state 
what is sought. Breadth deals with the requirement that the scope 
of the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the 
warrant is based." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). We have held that probable cause must exist to seize all 
the items of a particular type described in the warrant. United 
States v. Spilofro, 800 F.2d 959,963 (gth Cir. 1986). 
Accordingly, whether the search warrant in Reynolds' case was overbroad 
depends on whether the supporting affidavit provided probable cause to search 
Reynolds' bedroom, regardless of whether the rental arrangement of that 
bedroom was known or described. Cf. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 85 (search warrant 
execution was valid because officers reasonably believed the third floor had only 
one apartment (McWebb's), they stopped searching upon realization they were 
searching a second apartment (Garrison's) and that the warrant was overbroad 
because, impliedly3, there was no probable cause to search Garrison's 
apartment). Detective Stiles' affidavit for a search warrant revealed that when he 
The Supreme Court stated: "Thus, the scope of a lawful search is 'defined by 
the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to 
believe that it may be found."' Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84 (quoting United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982)). Later in Garrison, 480 U.S. at 86-87, the Court 
-
explained: 
If the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor 
contained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on 
the third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, 
they would have been obligated to limit their search to McWebb's 
apartment. Moreover, as the officers recognized, they were 
reauired to discontinue the search of respondent's apartment as 
sobn as they discovered that there were two separate'units on the 
third floor and therefore were put on notice of the risk that they 
might be in a unit erroneously included within the terms of the 
warrant. 
was inside the residence investigating the death of a child, he "smelled the odor 
of growing marijuana in the residence, apparently coming from an upstairs 
bedroom that is locked," and that he "recognizes the smell of marijuana plants 
based upon his training and experience." (R., p.44.) During his suppression 
hearing testimony, Detective Stiles said he could tell the difference between 
growing marijuana and dried marijuana, and that the bedroom on the left 
(Reynolds' bedroom) had an odor of growing marijuana, and as "you got close to 
the bedroom door on the left, you could smell it pretty strongly" from outside the 
bedroom. (Supp.Tr., p.ll,L.11 -p.12, L.5;p.15, L.16-p.18,L.25.) The 
search warrant in Reynolds' case was issued to investigate "possession of 
methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia 
for the use of controlled substances, and injury to child including 
methamphetamine, marijuana, and paraphernalia, items used for the cultivation 
of marijuana plants including . . . ." (R., p.40 (emphasis added).) Therefore, one 
of the areas of the residence at 6501 W Poplar targeted by the search warrant 
was Reynolds' bedroom -- where the smell of growing marijuana was plainly 
detected. In short, because Detective Stiles' affidavit provided probable cause to 
search Reynolds' bedroom for drug contraband related to the smell of growing 
marijuana, the search warrant cannot be deemed to have been overbroad as to 
him -- regardless of how his bedroom's legal arrangement was described. 
3. Assumina. Ar~uendo, There Was Some Defect In The Description 
Of The Place To Be Searched, The Search Of Reynolds' Bedroom 
Was Still Reasonable Because Detective Stiles Did Not Know, And 
Should Not Have Reasonably Known. Of The Multi-Unit Character 
Of The Residence 
Even assuming, arguendo, that was some defect in the description of the 
place to be searched, and that the search warrant was therefore overbroad, the 
search was still reasonab~e.~ The suppression hearing testimony of Detective 
Stiles and Reynolds established that Detective Stiles did not know, nor should he 
reasonably have known, about the multi-unit character of the Poplar residence. 
Therefore, under Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, the search of Reynolds' bedroom 
pursuant to the search warrant was reasonable. 
The district court summarized the testimony of Detective Stiles and 
Reynolds in regard to the known character of Reynolds' bedroom as follows (with 
references to the record added in brackets): 
Detective Stiles said there were two bedrooms on the main 
level of the home and a basement. [Supp. Tr., p.13, Ls.9-22.1 The 
two main floor bedrooms were locked, in that the door knobs on the 
doors to these rooms were locked. [Supp. Tr., p.14, Ls.5-20; p.28, 
L.22 - p.29, L.4.1 . . . There was no indication from anything inside 
or outside of the house that indicated that it was a boarding house, 
according to Detective Stiles. [Supp. Tr., p.16, Ls.8-17.1 
Detective Stiles said he had no indication, prior to obtaining 
the search warrant, that this house was a boarding house. [Supp. 
Tr., p.25, Ls.6-13.1 He did know that there were several people 
living in the house. [Supp. Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.21, L.9; p.28, Ls.6-10; 
It bears repeating that the state does not concede there was no probable 
cause to search Reynolds' bedroom. To the contrary, the strong smell of 
growing marijuana easily provided probable cause to obtain a search warrant for 
that bedroom. 
p.47, L.21 - p.48, L. l ;  p.49, Ls.2-4, 17-19.] Detective Stiles said it 
was not uncommon to find locked doors in a single family 
residence. [Supp. Tr., p.46, Ls.4-1 T .] 
The defendant testified that he had a rental agreement to 
rent his bedroom and that he also had access to the common 
areas, but the other bedroom was rented to another man and the 
basement was rented to a couple. [Supp. Tr., p.53, L.21 - p.55, 
L.15.1 
The defendant said that he specifically told Detective Stiles 
about the rental arrangement in the house [Supp. Tr., p.56, Ls.9- 
191, but he later conceded that he recognized no distinction 
between the terms "roommates" and "renters" [Supp. Tr., p.71, L . l l  
- p.72, L.11 and he later indicated that his conversation with 
Detective Stiles concerning the rental arrangement in the house 
may have consisted of nothing more than telling him who resided in 
the various bedrooms [Supp. Tr., p.72, L.23 - p.73, L.13.1 
The defendant testified that all residents had free access to 
the bathroom, kitchen, and the living room. [Supp. Tr., p.66, L.20 - 
p.67, L.6.1 The defendant testified that all residents also had 
access to the residence by the entry doors and they all had keys to 
these doors. [Supp. Tr., p.67, L.14 - p.68, L.13.1 The defendant 
said that on March 3, 2007, there were no individual designations 
on the doors or any other designations in or outside the house to 
indicate that the bedrooms were separately rented. [Supp. Tr., 
p.68, L.14 - p.69, L.2.1 
(R., pp.69-71.) 
In rendering its decision, the district court concluded: 
In addition, Detective Stiles testified, and the court credits his 
testimony, that he did not know that the residence was a boarding 
house. The defendant's own testimony was unclear concerning the 
detail he provided Detective Stiles concerning the contractual 
arrangements of the bedroom rentals and the court believes that he 
simply told Detective Stiles that he was an occupant of the house 
along with his other roommates and he testified that he did not 
"specifically clarify at all if [he] had access to anybody else's 
rooms." 
(R., p.73.) 
The district court's review of the suppression hearing testimony fully 
supports its determination that Detective Stiles did not know, nor should he 
reasonably have known, that Reynolds lived in the Poplar residence as a 
separate boarder. Such a finding is significant. In United States v. Gilman, 684 
F.2d 616,618 (gth Cir. 1982), the court explained: 
Even if a warrant authorizes the search of an entire premises 
containing multiple units while reciting probable cause as to a 
portion of the premises only, it does not follow either that the 
warrant is void or that the entire search is unlawful. United States 
v. Whitney, 633 F.2d 902 (gth Cir. 1980)' cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
1004, 101 S.Ct. 1717, 68 L.Ed.2d 208 (1981)' stands for this 
proposition. The general rule voiding the warrant for an 
undisclosed multiunit structure, see United States v. Hinton, 219 
F.2d 324 (7" Cir 1955), does not apply if the defendant was in 
control of the whole premises or they were occupied in common, if 
the entire premises were suspect, or if the multiunit character of the 
premises was not known to the officers. . . . 
Probable cause was stated for the offices, and the 
overbreadth of the warrant does not require suppression of 
evidence seized pursuant to that aspect of the search. 
(Emphasis added); see United States v. Whitnev, 633 F.2d 902, 907 and n.3 (list 
of exceptions to general rule and no evidence suggested officers were aware 
there were two dwellings); United States v. Alexander, et al., 761 F.2d 1294, 
1301 (gth Cir. 1985) (discussing Whitney). As stated in Gilman, 684 F.2d at 618, 
"the general rule voiding the warrant for an undisclosed multiunit structure" does 
not apply "if the multiunit character of the premises was not known to the 
officers." 
In Garrison, 480 U.S. at 81, police officers executed a search warrant for 
the third floor of a building which was believed to consist entirely of one 
apartment occupied by a Mr. McWebb. However, after officers entered the third 
floor and began searching, they realized the third floor was divided into two 
apartments, one occupied by McWebb and the other by Garrison, and that they 
had already seized heroin, cash, and drug paraphernalia from Garrison's 
apartment. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 81. The officers curtailed their search of 
Garrison's apartment as soon as they realized they were searching his apartment 
instead of McWebb's. In determining whether the factual mistake invalidated 
the search warrant, the Court first explained, "If the officers had known, or should 
have known, that the third floor contained two apartments before they entered 
the living quarters on the third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the 
warrant, they would have been obligated to limit their search to McWebb's 
apartment." Garrison, 480 U.S. at 86. The Court then analogized the facts to 
those in Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971). concluding: 
In [Hillj, we considered the validity of the arrest of a man 
named Miller based on the mistaken belief that he was Hill. The 
police had probable cause to arrest Hill and they in good faith 
believed that Miller was Hill when they found him in Hill's 
apartment. As we explained: 
"The upshot was that the officers in good faith 
believed Miller was Hill and arrested him. They were 
quite wrong as it turned out, and subjective good faith 
belief would not in itself justify either the arrest or the 
subsequent search. But sufficient probability, not 
certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under 
the Fourth Amendment and on the record before us 
the officers' mistake was understandable and the 
arrest a reasonable response to the situation facing 
them at the time." [Citation to Hill omitted.] 
While Hill involved an arrest without a warrant, its underlying 
rationale that an officer's reasonable misidentification of a person 
does not invalidate a valid arrest is equally applicable to an officer's 
reasonable failure to appreciate that a valid warrant describes too 
broadly the premises to be searched. Under the reasoning in Hill, 
the validity of the search of respondent's apartment pursuant to a 
warrant authorizing the search of the entire third floor depends on 
whether the officers' failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant 
was objectively understandable and reasonable. Here it 
unquestionably was. The objective facts available to the officers at 
the time suggested no distinction between McWebb's apartment 
and the third-floor premises. 
For that reason, the officers properly responded to the 
command contained in a valid warrant even if the warrant is 
interpreted as authorizing a search limited to McWebb's apartment 
rather than the entire third floor. 
Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87-88 (emphasis added); see Mena v. Citv of Simi Valley, 
226 F.3d 103 1 ,I 038 (gih Cir. 2000). 
As in Garrison, the officers in Reynolds' case did not know, nor should 
they reasonably have known, about the multi-unit character of the residence at 
6501 W Poplar. (See R., pp.67-75.) Therefore, even assuming the search 
warrant in Reynolds' case was overbroad because it described the whole house 
instead of Reynolds' bedroom and the common areas, the search warrant is not 
invalid. The detective's "failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was 
objectively understandable and reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. 
Garrison, 480 U.S. at 88. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Reynolds' conditional guilty pleas to manufacturing a controlled substance 
and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
DATED this 30th day of March 2009. 
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